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THE NEW IVAN THE TERRIBLE: PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE SPECTER OF THE RussIAN
MAFIA
INTRODUCTION
THE SCENE IS A WOOD PANELED STUDY, New York, circa 1946.
Outside, a traditional Sicilian wedding celebration is in full swing. An
undertaker stands before Don Vito Corleone, requesting justice for the
rape of his daughter, justice which the legitimate world could not provide.
Don Corleone looks at the man and because no Sicilian can refuse a
request on the day of his daughter's wedding, grants his wish. The
request is granted, however, on the condition that the undertaker is now
indebted to the Corleone family, and may be needed someday to perform
a service in return.
Images such as this from the opening scene of "The Godfather"
dominate the popular perception of organized crime.' When one thinks of
the "Mafia," many times it is from this "Godfather" point-of-view, with
Sicilians like the Corleones speaking of "honor" and "business" as a
justification for their illicit activities. While the Mafia immortalized by
Vito Corleone is still a threat, a much larger problem is on the rise-the
Russian Mafia, known to Russians as "The Organizasiya."2
Unlike the Mafia of "The Godfather," which was organized in New
York as five distinct families, "Russian Mafia" does not refer to a single
group. Instead, it is a blanket term describing the nearly 6,000 Russian
organized criminal groups operating world-wide.3 The groups are divided
according to three main classifications: ethnicity, region, and trade.4 The
Moscow area exemplifies this breakdown.5 The Dolgoprudnaya and
Solntsevo derive their names from their Moscow neighborhoods. Their
operational specialties include protection rackets and slot machines.6
Ethnic groups also specialize, such as the Azerbaijanis, who control the
THE GODFATHER (Paramount, 1972).
2 See James Langton, Godfathers of the East: From Russia With Blood, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 7, 1993, at 23.
' See Russia's Mafia: More Crime Than Punishment, THE ECONOMIST, July 9,
1994.
, Claire Sterling, Redfellas, The Growing Power of Russia's Mafia, NEW REPUBLIC,
April 11, 1994, at 19, 20.
5 Id.
6 See id.
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drug trade.7 Other ethnic groups, such as the Chechen, are more diversi-
fied. Chechens are particularly notorious in their breadth of activity with
involvement in several areas of criminal conduct from contract killings to
drug trafficking!
The Moscow example is only a small slice of Russian organized
crime's worldwide activities. Russian Mafia groups have established
themselves throughout Europe and the United States in activities including
drug trafficking, money laundering, prostitution, and, most importantly,
trafficking in nuclear weapons materials.9 One commentator has stated:
The Russian Mafia is a union of racketeers without equal. Unlike the
Mafia in Sicily, which it admires and copies as a standard of excellence,
it has no home seat or central command. There are no ancestral enemies
or common bloodlines. Nevertheless, its proliferating clans are invading
every sphere of life, usurping political power, taking over state enter-
prises and fleecing natural resources. They are engaged in extortion,
theft, forgery, armed assault, contract killing, swindling, drug running,
arms smuggling, prostitution, gambling, loan sharking, embezzling,
money laundering and black marketing-all on a monumental and in-
creasingly international scale."
James Woolsey, former Director of the CIA, recently testified before
Congress on the Russian Mafia's threat to U.S. security. 1 Woolsey gave
three reasons why the Russian Mafia is such a critical concern. First,
Russia is a country of enormous strategic interest due to its stockpile of
nuclear weapons materials. Second, the United States has an extreme
interest in the outcome of Russia's transition to a market economy and
democracy. Finally, Russian organized crime has become a menace
threatening the United States not only from abroad, but internally as
well. 2
Due to the international nature of the Russian Mafia's activities and
its lack of a central organization, it follows that international cooperation
in combating it is essential. However, due to procedural barriers in
7 Id.
g See id.
See Pyotr Yudin, Ministry, FBI Sign Deal on Cooperation, Moscow TIMES, July
6, 1994; Hearing on International Organized Crime and Nuclear Security, former CIA
Director, Before House Foreign Affairs Comm., 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1994)
[hereinafter Woolsey Testimony] (statement by James Woolsey, former CIA Director)
available in LEXIS, World Library, News File.
10 Sterling, supra note 4, at 19.
" See Woolsey Testimony, supra note 9.
12 Id.
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international criminal law, a uniform system of transnational criminal
enforcement does not exist. Traditionally, criminal law has been the
responsibility of domestic legal systems.'3 Although there have been
instances of international cooperation, most enforcement efforts have been
through bilateral treaties. National sovereignty and the reluctance of
national courts to adjudicate foreign law have created barriers to effective
transnational criminal enforcement. As a result, the system fails to
recognize the international nature of modem organized crime, creating
difficulties in implicating international groups such as the Russian Ma-
fia.14
This failure is exemplified by a demonstration of how "domestic"
crime has developed on an international scale. Normally a local crime,
Russian organized crime has taken prostitution and the sex trade to an
international level. The consequences can be deadly and disruptive.
Russian groups lure young women into prostitution inside Russia, and
then export them to countries where the earning potential for hard curren-
cy is greater. When Russian organized crime is denied a cut of profits,
situations such as the recent Frankfurt brothel murders arise. 6 Although
the prostitution and murders occurred in Germany, only German authori-
ties were able to prosecute. 7 The extent of Russian involvement will not
be eliminated by single arrests. 8 In cases like the Frankfurt murders,
successful prosecution will not stop the problem, making related violence
probable.
On a more sophisticated scale, Russian organized crime is also
causing serious disruption of world financial institutions. Because Russian
organized crime controls at least half of Russia's banks, it is easily able
13 HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 787-
88 (3rd. ed. 1986).
14 Id. at 788.
"5 But cf Jonathon Manthorpe, Vladivostok Murders Shed Light in Vice Ring; Hong
Kong Prosecutor, Prostitute Slain, THE GAZETE (Montreal), July 4, 1994, at E7.
Although not directly related to the problems seen in Europe, the article is an example
of the international consequences of circumventing the will of Russian organized crime.
6 See Life and Death In a Frankfurt Brothel, Press Association Limited, Aug. 17,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File. In August 1994, four prostitutes
and two owners of a Frankfurt brothel were found murdered. The murders were
apparently in retaliation for the owner's independent procurement of prostitutes, thereby
cutting Russian organized crime out of its percentage of revenue.
17 David Crossland, Brothel Victims Include Four From Ex-Soviet Union, Reuters
World Service, Aug. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
Evidence of threats against the prostitutes' families in Eastern Europe and Russia
suggest international control.
Is Id.
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to tap into a major money supply, enabling it to take control of legitimate
businesses both foreign and domestic.19 It is through these legitimate
businesses that organized crime expands its operations, using them as
cover for new operations." These tens of millions of dollars stolen from
Russian banks contribute to the nearly fifteen billion dollars in cash
already removed from Russia by organized crime." Since the money to
finance criminal activities originates from currency shuttled out of Russia,
effective international cooperation could keep some of this currency
within the country.22 If not, Russia's economic situation will not im-
prove, further destabilizing the country.
Nuclear smuggling poses the greatest threat to world security. The
recent arrests of smugglers carrying nuclear material to Germany under-
scores the problem.' While Germany or another third country can arrest
smugglers caught with the actual material, better coordination of enforce-
ment could stop smuggling at the source while simultaneously destroying
foreign distribution networks.
Considering the grave threat the Russian Mafia poses to world
security, international criminal law must begin to develop the procedural
mechanisms to combat the problem on a global scale. The development
of international criminal procedural mechanisms will enable effective
prosecution of internally committed crimes while assisting other countries
in fighting related activity.
This Note will not attempt to create a new model of international
criminal procedure. Because of national sovereignty and jurisdictional
issues, it would be impractical to devise a new system of international
evidence gathering and prosecution. Instead, this Note works within the
current system to find a way for nations to effectively cooperate in
combating organized crime while still preserving national sovereignty. The
first section identifies the problems and scope of Russian organized crimi-
nal activity in its three main arenas: Russia, the United States, and
Germany. Section Two explores the traditional notions of international
criminal law, specifically the recognized principles and problems of
transnational enforcement procedures. The Note then turns to an analysis
'9 Paul Klebnikov, Joe Stalin's Heirs, FORBEs, Sep. 27, 1993, at 124.
20 Claire Sterling, Containing the New Criminal Nomenklatura, in GLOBAL OR-
GANIZED CRIME, THE NEW EMPIRE OF EvIL 106, 120 (Linnea P. Raine & Frank J.
Cilluffo eds., 1994).
2 See Klebnikov, supra note 19, at 124.
2 id.
' Renssalear Lee, The International Black Market: Coping With Drugs, Thugs, and
Fissile Materials, in GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRIME, THE NEW EMPIRE OF EvI. 80, 81
(Linnea P. Raine & Frank J. Cilluffo eds., 1994).
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of a system of bilateral cooperation that has proven effective in the past
mutual legal assistance treaties, (MLATs). While this arrangement is
effective bilaterally, it could be expanded to a multilateral arrangement,
something not previously attempted on a large scale. The Note concludes
with an analysis and demonstration of the MLAT's practicability and
ultimately argues for a new, hybrid system of the MLAT, a trilateral legal
assistance treaty (TLAT), between the United States, Russia, and Germa-
ny.
I. CURRENT MAFiA Acrivrry
A. Internal Activity in Russia
In February 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared organized
crime a direct threat to Russia's strategic interests and national security.24
According to the CIA, President Yeltsin's concerns are well-founded.
Of the 2,000 banks operating in Russia today, a majority are controlled
by organized crime.' Control is exerted as follows. An organized crimi-
nal group will deposit massive amounts of money in a particular bank,
causing the institution to adjust its lending and operational habits by
involving itself in broad-scale ventures.27 The groups will then demand
payments or kickbacks with the threat of withdrawing what has become
a large share of the bank's reserves. Such control disrupts the activities
of lending institutions that might otherwise lend money to private industry
and business. This clamping of resources is particularly troublesome in
Russia's economy where private industry is experiencing difficulty
establishing itself.
Banks are not the only targets of Mafia activity. The state treasury
has also fallen victim to organized crime. Cooperation between politicians
and the Mafia enables enormous amounts of state funds to be channeled
to the Mafia, including Western aid.29 According to President Yeltsin,
emergency international aid in the Winter of 1992 was almost completely
deflected into the hands of organized crime.0 The reasons for this were
24 Russia's Mafia: More Crime Than Punishment, supra note 3; Russia: Conference
on Combating Crime; Yeltsin Outlines Ways of Combating Crime. BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Feb. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
2 Id.
' See Woolsey Testimony, supra note 9.
7 Id.
2 Id.
2' Criminal Muscle Moves in on the Open Markets of Eastern Europe, THE RE-
CORDER (San Francisco), April 22, 1993, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
3 Id.
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twofold. First, the Mafia was interested in the private sale of the food aid
packages. More important was the effect that control of this food supply
had on black market prices. The control of scarce items translated into an
enormous source of revenue for the Mafia, since it charged whatever
price it wished for the food.3'
This activity has seriously eroded confidence in the ability of the
Russian government to reform. The widespread view among average
Russians is that Yeltsin's reforms have only benefitted criminals.32 In the
international community, Western business is reluctant to invest in Russia.
Almost all ventures require a "profit tax" which must be paid to the
appropriate group to insure smooth operations.33 Failure to pay has
resulted in the murder of several Western businessmen. Although many
may be involved in organized crime, the Moscow Police Department
suggests that many have simply paid off organized crime and are now
trying to renege.34 Other dangers also exist. Credit Lyonnais, a Paris-
based bank, must post its own guards armed with heavy automatic
weapons outside of its St. Petersburg branch to discourage attacks and
robberies.35 These examples demonstrate how organized crime is seriously
undermining the transition to a free market and impeding the investment
and development so desperately needed by Russia.
B. Russian Mafia Activity in Germany
In a society commonly associated with law and order, the presence
of the Russian Mafia is seen as a threat to Germany's security. The main
activities of Russian organized crime are drug trafficking, weapons and
nuclear materials smuggling, prostitution, money laundering, and gam-
bling.36 Berlin is considered by most law enforcement officials to be the
center of Russian mob activity in Europe, due to the presence of 300,000
ex-Soviet citizens.37 Many of the same activities that occur in Russia
31 Id.
31 See generally Langton, supra note 2.
33 id.
34 See Klebnikov supra note 19, at 124. Peter Derby, an American who runs the
Russian-based Dialog Bank, states that "[ilt's getting more and more difficult for
Western businesses to avoid transactions that involve the Mafia." Id.
31 Steve Liesman, With Caution, Foreign Banks Step Into a Russian Maze, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, § 3, at 8.
6 Timot Szent-Ivanyi, Mafia Gangs Spread Into Germany, Say Crimebusters,
Reuters World Service, June 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws
File.
3' Barbara Demick, Russian Mafia Hits Germany: Members of "The Organization"
Blamed for Violent Crime, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 21, 1993, at A28.
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occur in Germany as well, with prostitution and forced protection pay-
ments among the most common." Recently, Russian Mafia networks
have begun to penetrate financial markets with the goal of laundering ille-
gally obtained cash.39 Prostitution is another large revenue generator,
especially in larger cities.4' Events such as the murder of six people in
a Frankfurt brothel the week of August 20, 1994 highlight the violence
associated with Russian organized crime.4
This activity is trivial compared with nuclear materials smuggling.
On May 10, 1994, German authorities confiscated a small amount of
weapons-grade plutonium. Although the sample was not enough to build
a bomb, it was proof that Russian organized crime had the capability to
move dangerous nuclear material out of Russia. In August, similar arrests
were made in Munich as a Colombian and two Spaniards were caught
carrying 350 grams of plutonium off a flight from Moscow. Although not
directly linked to the Russian Mafia, this followed a pattern that Hans-
Ludwig Zachert, head of the German Bundeskriminalamts, Germany's
version of the FBI, stated was generally attributed to Russian organized
crime.42
C. Russian Mafia Activity in the United States
While Russian organized crime does not operate in the United States
on the same scale as it does in Germany or Russia, it is firmly estab-
lished in this country. The principal focus of its activity is in the
Brighton Beach section of Brooklyn, New York. The rapid growth of
Russian organized crime prompted the U.S. Department of Justice in
January 1994 to elevate the Russian Mafia to its highest investigative
3s Id.
31 Jimmy Bums, Survey of Fraud-Prevention and Detection, FiN. TIMEs (London),
October 18, 1994, at 34.
' Monika Hillemacher, Authorities Fear Russian Mafia Linked to Frankfurt Brothel
Murders, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Aug. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
News File (reporting that German police suspect that the Russian Mafia was responsible
because of the degree of cruelty and ferocity involved which is indicative of murders
committed by the Russian Mafia). Frankfurt and Berlin are the primary German centers
of Russian vice rings.
"' Mark Almond, This New Arms Race That The Whole World Must Fear, As Rus-
sia Falls Into the Hands of Racketeers Pursuing A Disturbing Kind of Power, DAILY
MAIL (London), Aug. 20, 1994, at 8-9.
42 Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations of Crime in the Former Soviet Union, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1994)
[hereinafter Zachert Testimony] (statement of Hans-Ludwig Zachert, President of the
German Federal Criminal Police) available in LEXIS, World Library, Cumws File.
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priority." This level of investigative priority is the same as that used for
most other major organized crime groups, such as the Italian La Cosa
Nostra, Asian groups, and Colombian cocaine cartels." As part of this
action, the FBI also created a squad in its New York office to deal
exclusively with Russian organized crime.45 The Russian Mafia is known
to be involved in drug smuggling, credit card fraud, and, most prominent-
ly, a nationwide gasoline tax scam.'
Although Russian organized crime is involved in many operations,
the prime concern of the U.S. government is its international activity,
particularly in the area of nuclear smuggling. In James Woolsey's testimo-
ny before Congress, he stated that the United States needs to understand
the Russian Mafia, its strengths, and capacity to influence the develop-
ment of Russia's new political institutions.47 The nuclear threat prompted
Louis Freeh, Director of the FBI, to open a field office in Moscow to aid
in the collection of information about Russian organized crime.'
II. CURRENT COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES, GERMANY, AND RUSSIA
While the United States, Russia, and Germany are cooperating in
combating organized crime, none of the activity is occurring in concert
between the three nations and there is no specific framework governing
information exchanges. The problem lies not in current police structures,
but in the inability of politicians to create a legal framework for coordi-
nation in international criminal enforcement.49 This problem is particular-
ly acute with the Germans."0 Even the members of the European Union
are unable to agree on basic issues such as the structure and headquarters
of an all-European Union police force.5 ' Issues of sovereignty also arise,
43 Selwyn Raab, Influx of Russian Gangsters Troubles F.B.I in Brooklyn, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1994, Al, B2.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 id.
47 See Woolsey Testimony, supra note 9.
Robert Green, F.B.I. Fears Russian Gang a Nuclear Threat, Reuters, May 25,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Cumws File.
49 Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, Press Conference by Russian
Federation Interior Ministry, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and German Police
Representatives on Prevention of Organized Crime (Aug. 12, 1993) (transcript available
in LEXIS, World Library, Arcnws File).
" See Criminal Muscle, supra note 29 (discussing the difficulties that the enforce-
ment agencies of several countries have experienced in dealing with organized crime
within their current procedural frameworks).
s Id.
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absent agreements, on the authority of foreign agents to act upon the soil
of another EU Member.52
These problems are more serious in dealings with Russia. The
majority of information exchanges have occurred at face-to-face meetings
between German and Russian criminal enforcement authorities. 3 Despite
these efforts, no unified system exists to coordinate investigatory ap-
proaches and activity.54 This makes it even more difficult to trace and
confirm the material's origin.55 Finally, in testimony before Congress, the
head of the German Criminal Police stated that Germany will not sign
any legal assistance treaties with Eastern European states, wishing instead
to incorporate them into the existing EU conventions.56 Such a situation
would require assent by the entire European Union, further slowing the
process of creating mechanisms of mutual cooperation.
The situation between the United States and Russia is only slightly
better. One example is the opening of an FBI office in Moscow. 7 While
this will lead to better exchanges of information, without a comprehensive
treaty arrangement 'defining the office's purpose, it will be impossible to
determine the scope of information that will be available. 8 This problem
was demonstrated by President Yeltsin's national security chief, Yuriy
Baturin, who emphasized that important transfers of nuclear information,
crucial to the control of the trafficking of weapons-grade materials, would
be impossible without the conclusion of a formal, comprehensive treaty
effectively covering security concerns. 9
III. INTERNATIONAL LIMITATIONS OF CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
The Russian Mafia is an international problem; therefore, an interna-
tional solution is appropriate. As demonstrated by Germany's reluctance
to enter into treaties of cooperation, states have typically recognized
criminal enforcement to be of a primarily domestic character. The tradi-
52 Id.
5' Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, Press Conference with Russian
Federation Federal Counterintelligence Service Officials (Sept. 22, 1994), transcript
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
54 Id.
" William Boston, Russian Mafia Has Nuclear Technology, Reuters World Service,
Aug. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
See Zachert testimony, supra note 42.
s FBI Chief Meets Russian Leaders; Reportedly Fails to Open FBI Mission. BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, July 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Curnws File.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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tional justifications have centered around jurisdiction and sovereignty.
Customary international law dictates that failing the existence of a
permissive rule derived from international custom or a convention to the
contrary, a state may not exercise its power in any form in the territory
of another state.' This bar on the ability to prescribe the domestic law
of one country on another, or prescriptive jurisdiction, severely limits the
ability of states to conduct investigations or arrests in a foreign territory.
The prescriptive jurisdiction limitation can be demonstrated in the
following hypothetical. Person X, intending to murder Person Y, inten-
tionally shoots and kills Person Y in Country A. Country A's legal
system recognizes homicide to be a legal act. Person Y's successor,
however, is outraged by Person X's actions and wishes Person X to be
prosecuted. Country B, on Country A's northern border, considers homi-
cide illegal. Recognizing the differing laws of homicide between Coun-
tries A and B, Person Y's successor files charges with Country B's
police.
Because the killing occurred in Country A, a sovereign and indepen-
dent state, the prescriptive jurisdiction limitation bars Country B from
prosecuting Person X because Country B may not prescribe its interpreta-
tion of homicide into Country A." The prescriptive jurisdiction rule,
however, does allow for exceptions in the case of a convention or cus-
tomary international practice. 2
The customary international practice exception was invoked in United
States v. Noriega.63 Manuel Noriega was indicted by a federal grand jury
for numerous violations of U.S. drug trafficking laws." Although none
of these criminal violations occurred within the actual territory of the
United States, the Court justified the prescription of U.S. law because
Noriega's offense, drug trafficking, was considered by customary interna-
tional law to be a universally condemned offense.'
Since Noriega's. conduct fell under the exception for universally
condemned offenses, the Court was able to claim jurisdiction over the
o S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp 1506, 1514-15 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
' Noriega was prosecuted under a variety of statutes. See generally 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1962 (1995) (racketeering and conspiracy); 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1995) (conspiracy); 21
U.S.C. § 959 (1995) (distribution of narcotics); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1995) (commission of
an offense against the United States); and 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (995) (promoting,
establishing, or carrying on an unlawful activity in interstate or foreign commerce).
65 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403, Reporter's Note 8 (1986), cited with approval in Noriega, 746 F.Supp at 1514.
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offense. Despite the successful prosecution, the narrow scope of the
Restatement exception does not encompass a wide variety of foreign
criminal acts. If an act is not "universally condemned" by the internation-
al community, Noriega holds that a state would then be unable to pre-
scribe its laws onto another territory.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain demonstrates the consequences of
violating the prescriptive jurisdiction limitation. Alvarez-Machain involved
the forced abduction and removal of a Mexican national to the United
States.' Unlike Noriega, who was wanted for drug trafficking violations,
a crime falling into the "universally condemned" exception, Alvarez-
Machain involved the arrest of a non-U.S. national for kidnapping and
murder. The murder and kidnapping occurred solely in Mexico and was
between Mexican citizens.67 If the conduct does not fall under the uni-
versal condemnation exception, international law permits arrests and
abductions only with the permission of local authorities." If permission
is granted, international law allows for removal and trial in the United
States if the delivery was not carried out in a manner that "shocks the
conscience of civilized society."'69 Because the Mexican government did
not grant U.S. authorities permission to arrest Alvarez-Machain, it filed a
formal protest against the action and demanded Alvarez-Machain's re-
turn7 Although the Supreme Court held that Alvarez-Machain's abduc-
tion did not violate international law, Alvarez-Machain has been interna-
tionally condemned.7' Other countries have found the activity to be
illegal, as in the South African case described in Justice Stevens' dissent,
where a South African court ruled in an analogous case that the forcible
abduction of a foreigner by South African authorities violated internation-
al law.' If Alvarez-Machain is consistently followed, the prescriptive
jurisdiction limitation would be unilaterally circumvented because state
police forces would be free to operate without limitation in foreign
countries. This could lead to diplomatic tensions as witnessed between the
United States and Mexico 3
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992).
67 id.
68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 432(1)(c)(2) (1986).
69 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 433(1)(b)(2) (1986); see also 28 U.S.C.S. § 2255, note 222 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
70 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct at 2188.
"' Harold H. Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Policy,
103 YALE L. J. 2391, 2405 (1994).
7 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2200. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Patrick M. Hagan, Government Sponsored Extraterritorial Abductions in the New
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
General principles of international law allow for some instances of
extraterritorial prescription of law.74 The first occurs when conduct
outside a territory has or is intended to have substantial effect within the
territory.' This provision, better known as the effects principle, has been
generally held to include situations where the effects of a given criminal
act are intended to cause or will cause substantial harm in the prosecuting
state.
76
The hypothetical homicide demonstrating the prescriptive jurisdiction
limitation can be modified to demonstrate the narrow scope of the effects
principle.7 Again, Person X has intentionally shot and killed Person Y
in Country A. Country B, were homicide is illegal, wishes to prosecute
Person X for murder. Although Country B concedes that under inter-
national law it cannot prescribe its laws on a foreign territory, 8 it argues
that the murder has affected its security through the knowledge of wanton
violence occurring across its borders.
United States. v. Evans demonstrates why Country B cannot apply
the effects principle. 79 Evans involves extraterritorial violations of the
Arms Control Export Act." Because arms sales to a terrorist group
would threaten or "affect" U.S. security, the court held Evans' arrest valid
even though the illegal conduct occurred in Bermuda."' International law,
however, limits the effects principle to a standard of reasonableness. 2
More specifically, the court notes the effects principle to be limited to
World Order: The Unclear Role of International Law in United States Courts and
Foreign Policy, 17 SUFFOLK TRASNAT'L L. REv. 438, 461-62, nn.110-13. Hagan argues
that extradition treaties, the normal procedure for obtaining custody over a foreign
actor, would be completely circumvented by this ruling. By operating outside of binding
treaties, police would violate international agreements and customary international legal
principles of sovereignty.
" The Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School, Jurisdiction With
Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L., Supp. 1, 435, 445 (1935).
7- RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1)(c) (1986).
76 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 cmt. c (1986).
77 Id.
79 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
7 United States v. Evans, 667 F.Supp 974, 980-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
8 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1995). The Arms Control Export Act was designed to control
illegal American weapons sales to third countries. See, e.g., Evans, 667 F. Supp. at
980-81.
" Evans, 667 F.Supp at 980-81.
2 Id. at 980, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 402(1)(c) cmt. d (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
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domestic statutes that contemplate threats to international activity, such as
arms sales, as opposed to activities with only local effects, such as Person
X's murder of Person Y.83
Closely related to the effects principle is the protective or universal
principle, which recognizes the right of a state to punish a limited class
of offenses committed outside its territory by persons not its nationals.84
United States v. Yunis defines this class of offenses as crimes recognized
by the world community to be of universal concern, such as piracy, slave
trading, hijackings, genocide, and war crimes." Yunis involved a Leba-
nese national who hijacked a Royal Jordanian Airlines flight from Bei-
rut.86 Because hijacking falls under this exception, the court was success-
fully able to exercise jurisdiction."
Despite the proper extension of jurisdiction, Yunis cautions that
courts should be reluctant to invoke the protective principle absent a clear
indication of legislative intent and recognition of international law.88
While in Yunis the act of hijacking clearly fit under both domestic and
international applications of the protective principle, less internationally
focused crimes, such as Person X's murder of Person Y, are more
difficult to justify.
IV. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF LARGE SCALE MULTILATERAL
COOPERATION: INTERPOL
Interpol, the international police force, is an organization of 146
member states whose primary mission is to collect and disseminate
information regarding the status and whereabouts of particular internation-
al criminals.89 This sharing of information, however, is not standardized
throughout the member states due to the varying national substantive
criminal law definitions and procedures.'
In the popular press, Interpol is tagged with the image of an organi-
3 Id. at 981.
14 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 cmt. f (1986).
' United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
16 Id. at 1086.
' Id. at 1089-90. The court cites the International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages, June 3, 1983, T.I.A.S. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 204, and the domestic
Hostage Taking Act 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1995) as justification both internationally and
domestically for the extension of jurisdiction under the protective or universal principle.
Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1091.
89 MALCOLM ANDERSON, POLICING THE WORLD: INTERPOL AND THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL POLICE CO-OPERATION 3 (1989).
90 Id. at 30
CASE W. RES. J. INTL L.
zation having the power to investigate and arrest criminals.9' This, how-
ever, is not the case. Various misperceptions surrounding Interpol's
purpose and existence illustrate how international criminal law limitations
affect procedures to investigate, arrest, and prosecute. Interpol does not
have the power to investigate or arrest suspects. Although the Interpol
"red notice" is usually treated as a request for the arrest of a suspect with
the assurance that extradition will follow, sovereign states are not bound
to respond.92 The principles surrounding the red notice are at odds with
international legal norms. While a state may voluntarily agree to appre-
hend a suspect upon issuance of a red notice, issues of jurisdiction and
sovereignty do not oblige cooperation. The prescriptive jurisdiction
limitations dictate that although a suspect may be sought internationally,
if the crime does not fall into the category of "universally condemned,"
foreign law may not be internationally prescribed.93 If the crime does
fall into the classification of "universally condemned," all foreign police
forces are barred from making arrests without consent from the affected
state.94 If Interpol does receive consent to arrest, it does not have the
power to extradite.9' To conform with international law, extradition of
suspects would then be dependent on the existence of a treaty between
the requesting and arresting states.96
Interpol is unable to coordinate the gathering of evidence for similar
reasons. Such activity would circumvent a state's sovereignty by allowing
a foreign government to operate in its territory.97 Alvarez-Machain again
exemplifies the consequences of such activity, as demonstrated by adverse
international feelings towards the decision.9" If the United States was
condemned for such activity, it follows that similar activity by Interpol
would be unwelcome as well.
One area where Interpol has proven effective is in its capacity to
relay information regarding a potential suspect's whereabouts. Such a
system of communication is helpful because it alerts the participating
9' Id. at 53
9' Id. at 30. "Red notices" are issued by Interpol at the request of national authori-
ties to alert other Interpol participants of a suspect's location. The practice of arresting
suspects upon posting of a red notice was followed by the United States until only
recently.
9' See supra notes 60-65 and related discussion.
94 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 432(1)(c)(2) (1986).
9s See ANDERSON, supra note 89, at 3.
' See Hagan, supra note 73, at 461-62.
97 Id. at 462-63; U.S. CONST. amend. V; STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 13, at 831.
9' See Hagan, supra note 73, at 457.
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countries to the location and activities of a certain criminal suspect.
However, there are problems with Interpol's ability to effectively dissemi-
nate information. The National Association of Police Chiefs warned that
Interpol's communication network gives terrorist-supporting states and
drug traffickers easy access to sensitive law enforcement information."
In addition, many of the local coordinators of Interpol are corrupt them-
selves, and use information to thwart law enforcement and procedure."
A glaring recent example was Interpol President Ivan Barbot's assistance
in aiding a known Palestinian terrorist to obtain secret medical treatment
in France.' In Europe, confidence in Interpol's ability to effectively
reduce crime has dwindled to the degree that European countries are
beginning to withdraw from the organization and are coordinating their
national police activities through a European Union-based organization,
Europol."
For countries outside this network, effective cooperation is difficult
because access to information is limited to only the participating states.
Europol, for example, concentrates only on EU affairs. 3 For this rea-
son, any Russian organized crime activities would only be covered in the
European sphere of operations.
As an actual functioning international police entity, the failure of
Interpol to move beyond information sharing to address problems in-
volved in transnational arrests and evidence gathering demonstrates the
need for a more closely coordinated treaty arrangement. Recently, 138
nations sent delegations to a conference sponsored by the United Nations
to discuss the possibility of drafting a new international convention that
would enable the parties to more easily prosecute leaders of organized
crime." However, law enforcement and UN leaders expressed skepti-
" U.S. Police Group Pursues Restrictions on Interpol, PR Newswire, May 5, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
"® Id. Police, under the influence of the drug cartels, will use information supplied
by Interpol to alert producers of potential actions against them, such as the uncovering
of hideouts. This allows them to stay ahead of the reach of the authorities. Id.
101 Id.
"02 U.S. Police Chiefs Applaud Action on Europol, PR Newswire, Nov. 3, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
103 ANDERSON, supra note 89, at 90, 170. In response to problems of Inter-European
cooperation, a Pan-European police organization under the authority of the E.C. (now
EU) has been suggested and now is ultimately effective. It is easily functional,
however, due to provisions of the E.U. treaty, which allows the central authorities of
the E.U. to issue directives and regulations forcing the member states to harmonize
such procedural rules as evidence gathering. This allows for smooth and easy imple-
mentation. Id.
04 Alan Cowell, 138 Nations Confer in Italy on Rise in Global Crime, N.Y. TIMES,
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cism about such a convention ever being negotiated, due to the classic
reasons of international sovereignty and the inherent problems of creating
a coordinated international enforcement procedure) 5 Such attitudes and
the impracticability of a broad-based treaty are even more persuasive
evidence for acting on a smaller, more controlled, and case-specific scale.
V. MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES AND THEIR APPLICATION
Due to questions of sovereignty and the lack of coordinated activity
among Germany, Russia, and the United States in fighting Russian
organized crime, there must be an understanding negotiated which a)
resolves questions of sovereignty, and b) identifies and creates legal
mechanisms to aid in the flow of information and ideas." One such
method that has proven to be effective are bilateral mutual legal assis-
tance treaties, or MLATs.' 7
MLATs are unique in that they coordinate enforcement and coopera-
tion in criminal matters by first identifying specific areas where there will
be cooperation and then creating legal mechanisms to facilitate the
transfer of such information." 8 Most importantly, the treaties force the
signatory parties to surrender certain trappings of sovereignty through the
allowance of foreign intrusion into traditionally domestic areas." 9 For
example, in Article 38, Section 2 of the MLAT between the United States
and Switzerland (Swiss MLAT), the parties specifically contract that
provisions of the Treaty shall take precedence over any inconsistent
provisions of the municipal laws in the contracting States." °
MLATs offer significant advantages over the current informal
cooperation schemes produced among the United States, Russia, and
Germany. Requests for evidence are facilitated more quickly, since all
that is necessary is to contact the treaty-specified representative of the
Nov. 22, 1994, at A6.
1o5 Id.
"o See C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity, the United States' Assault on
Foreign Bank Secrecy, 12 J. INT'L Bus. L., Winter 1992, at 454, 473.
101 Id. at 475.
108 STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 13, at 832.
" See, e.g., Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973,
U.S.-Switz., art. 9, 27 U.S.T. 2019, 2035 [hereinafter Swiss MLAT]. Article 9 discusses
the General Provisions for executing requests. Although the actual procedure for con-
ducting investigations follows that of the requested state, the Treaty requires consent to
intrusion and investigation if the evidence presented to the designated Central Authority
is credible.
11o Id. art 38, § 3, 27 U.S.T. at 2058.
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contracting state."' These representatives, or "central authorities" will
then process the request."' Efficiency is therefore greatly increased over
the old system of letters rogatory, which involved requests issued by a
court and sent through diplomatic channels."' Unlike MLATs, this sys-
tem involved several layers of communication." 4 Most importantly,
specific acts or crimes are identified as eligible for cooperation, doing
away with the procedural barriers limiting information transfers."5
The first major MLAT involving the United States was the 1973
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters"6 between the United
States and Switzerland. Entered into force officially in 1977, the Swiss
MLAT was unique in that it created a legal obligation on one state to
mutually assist the other in investigating transnational crime." 7 Long
known for its policies of bank secrecy, Switzerland was a haven for the
hiding of illicit criminal funds. The principle objective of the Swiss
MLAT was to allow the United States to penetrate bank secrecy laws and
access evidence that would normally be protected."'
Because U.S. and Swiss law traditionally did not allow this type of
foreign access, the parties were forced to enact legislation to facilitate
information exchanges."" Under the traditional method of information
transfer, letters rogatory, domestic courts were forced to abide by domes-
" Jones, supra note 106, at 476.
112 In the United States, the Central Authority is the Attorney General or his
designee. In Switzerland, the Central Authority is the Division of Police of the Federal
Department of Justice and Police in Bern. Swiss MLAT, supra note 109, art. 28, §
1, 27 U.S.T. at 2050. By vesting such power in centralized federal authorities, requests
under the Treaty are processed through efficient, recognized methods unlike letters
rogatory, which by their nature must be adapted to the specific situation at hand. Id.
113 Tiedemann v. The Signe, 37 F.Supp 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941). "Letters rogatory
are the medium . . . whereby one country, speaking through one of its courts, requests
another country, acting through its own courts and by methods of court procedure
peculiar thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to assist the administration of
justice in the former country . . . " Id.
14 Id. Even when the letter can be sent directly from the domestic court to the
foreign court, the procedure still takes time. The procedure can also be extremely costly
due to the arduous process of precise drafting necessary for a foreign judge to consider
a request. Finally, letters rogatory are limited by the laws of specific jurisdictions,
therefore limiting the amount of information that can be transferred.
115 See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text for an example of the procedural
difficulties resulting from the refusal of Italy to extradite in civil disputes.
116 See Swiss MLAT, supra note 109.
.l. Jones, supra note 106, at 473.
118 Id.
119 Swiss MLAT, supra note 109, art. 38, § 3, 27 U.S.T. at 2058.
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tic laws limiting the amount or type of information to be transferred."2
Comparatively, the MLAT procedure is less cumbersome because it
involves cooperation between police and prosecutors as opposed to
diplomatic channels. The Swiss MLAT's need for implementation legisla-
tion also forced the removal of domestic legal bars and provided for
transfers under the auspices of designated central authorities.
The Swiss MLAT provides access and use of information not only
for assistance in criminal proceedings, but also by administrative bodies
in Switzerland and the United States such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).' This administrative component is important due
to the increased use of securities exchanges and other financial markets
for the laundering of illegal funds by groups such as the Russian Ma-
fia."' Included are the mutual powers of the signatory countries' courts
to issue an administrative order declaring a violation, or to command a
person to comply with applicable laws." Such provisions allow the
courts of the signatory country to stop illegal conduct without the intru-
sion of foreign control. Secondly, the signatory countries have the power,
upon request, to deny licensing to a party involved in a specific trade or
business, thereby disallowing an individual from using a legitimate trade,
such as that of the stock broker, as a front for illicit activity." 4 The
parties may also use evidence obtained through the Swiss MLAT to im-
pose penalties under administrative law, while courts have the power to
freeze and confiscate assets."z
Several cases have been successfully prosecuted in the United States
through evidence gathered under the Swiss MLAT. An example is United
States v. Sturman, where Reuben and David Sturman were on trial for
attempted tax evasion, filing false income tax returns, and endeavoring to
obstruct justice in relation to their business in the production, sale, and
distribution of pornography. After submitting evidence to the Swiss
government of the defendants' involvement in organized crime, U.S.
attorneys were easily able to obtain the men's Swiss bank records."
Sturman illustrates the ease with which the evidence was transferred and
20 The Signe, 37 F.Supp at 820.
"2 Switzerland-United States: Exchange of Letters Concerning the Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 3, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 168, 169-71 (1994) [hereinafter
Swiss-U.S. Letters].
2 See Peter Millspaugh, Global Securities Trading: The Question of a Watchdog,
26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 355, 358 (1992).
123 Swiss-U.S. Letters, supra note 121, at 169-71.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 171.
126 United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1482 (6 Cir. 1991).
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also how the problems of jurisdiction and sovereignty were easily over-
come through the advance MLAT arrangement. Without this treaty,
obtaining the evidence would have been far more complicated due to the
involvement of diplomatic channels.27 The greater levels of bureaucracy
would have slowed the process and allowed more room for snags in the
evidence transfer."
The Swiss MLAT also prompted the Swiss banking industry to
cooperate in organized crime investigations. Due to the time needed to
produce legislation in Switzerland to facilitate the collection of evidence
barred by bank secrecy practices, the Swiss government agreed to provide
information regarding securities transactions when requested by the U.S.
Department of Justice and SEC through the Swiss Federal Office for
Police Matters. 29 Such cooperation provided for information exchanges
even before the essential legislation was passed.
The 1985 MLAT between Italy and the United States (Italian
MLAT) contains many of the Swiss MLAT's provisions.3 ° The key
difference is the treaty's focus - organized crime as opposed to bank
secrecy.' Like the Swiss MLAT, the Italian MLAT requires all agen-
cies with criminal investigative functions, such as the SEC and the IRS,
to request assistance through the U.S. Attorney General.'
MLATs have been a great success in the fight against organized
crime. The Italian MLAT was crucial in the cracking of an international
narcotics conspiracy known as "the Pizza Convention."'3 The Italian
MLAT's provisions allowed for the live testimony of two Italian nation-
als, Tommaso Buscetta and Salvatore Contorno.3 The Treaty's ability
to facilitate the transfer of foreign witnesses was directly related to the
,2' See supra notes 111-15 and related discussion.
' By enabling the U.S. attorneys to directly contact their Swiss counterparts, the
evidence transfer was more easily obtained. If the treaty had not been in place, the old
procedural mechanisms would have been in effect and Switzerland would not have been
legally obligated to divulge this information.
' Swiss-U.S. Letters, supra note 121, at 169-72.
' See Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9, 1982, U.S.-
Italy, 24 I.L.M. 1536 [hereinafter Italian MLAT].
13 Types of assistance and cooperation include the locating of persons, service of
documents, document production, execution of search and seizure requests, taking of
testimony, transfer of persons for testimony, and the immobilization and forfeiture of
assets. Id. art. 1, § 2(a-g), 24 I.L.M. at 1539.
132 Id. art. 2, §§ 1, 2, 24 LL.M. at 1539.
3 Richard A. Martin, Problems in International Law Enforcement, 14 FORDHAM
INT'L L. J. 519, 522 (1991).
131 Id. See, e.g., United States v. Badalamenti, 626 F.Supp. 658, 660 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (discussing Contomo's testimony).
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appearance of Contorno and Buscetta in the United States.' 35 Without
such a procedure, Italy would have been under no international obligation
to produce these witnesses. 36
The inadequacies of Interpol also demonstrate the usefulness of the
MLAT arrangement. For example, Interpol could be used to tip off
American authorities about activity in Russia or Germany, but an MLAT
would be more effective in acting upon such information. An example
where an MLAT could have provided further procedural clarification
occurred in Sami v. United States.37 If an MLAT would have been in
force in Sami (at this time the Italian MLAT had not been negotiated)
perhaps Interpol could have been more effective in helping to stop Sami
from further running with the children. The questionable grounds for
extradition between the United States and both Italy and Germany illus-
trate Interpol's tenuous ability to combat international crime.' If
Interpol informs the United States of the presence of a Russian Mafia
member in Germany, but there is not an extraditable offense on either
side, the process is frustrated. However, with an MLAT designed to settle
such procedural difficulties seen in Sami, investigations to produce
evidence would be aided by Interpol's information-gathering mecha-
nisms.'39
Although Interpol could be effective in transferring information, its
135 See Italian MLAT, supra note 130, art. 16, 24 I.L.M. at 1541. This article
discusses the mechanisms for transferring persons in custody in the requested state to
the requesting state for testimony. It in effect allows the requesting state to "borrow"
the witness for testimony, while preserving the custody of the witness for his or her
return to the requested state for trial.
136 See discussion and hypotheticals regarding prescriptive jurisdiction, supra part III.
" See Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Sami case in-
volved the kidnapping of children in a custody dispute. Mr. Sami, an Afghan national,
escaped to Italy and then Germany with his American children in defiance of a Florida
custody order in an attempt to remove his children to Afghanistan. Although Interpol
notified the United States of Mr. Sami's presence in Italy, extradition was not undertak-
en immediately due to diplomatic difficulties in arranging the arrest and extradition.
Many of the procedural issues that arose in this dispute were resolved in the Italian
MLAT. See generally Italian MLAT, supra note 130, 24 I.L.M. at 1536 (facilitating the
extradition of nationals fleeing the jurisdiction of a signatory).
,38 Sami, 617 F.2d at 757. Due to the absence of a treaty, Italy would not extradite
because the kidnapping grew out of a civil action-the child custody dispute.
"3 See, e.g., Italian MLAT, supra note 130, art. 1, 24 I.L.M. at 1537. Article I
limits cooperation to criminal matters, however the parties may, if desired, include civil
matters as well. No known international law would limit these treaties to simply
criminal matters.
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ability to stop Russian organized crime by itself is not sufficient. 4
Other arrangements are needed to supplement Interpol's activities. Interpol
itself would only be useful in locating and gathering information in third
countries outside of an MLAT arrangement, since any MLAT could allow
such information-gathering functions to be coordinated between the
contracting states."' This would increase security and render any evi-
dence gathered admissible. Such is not the case with Interpol, which is
unable to provide for these types of procedural safeguards. 42
VI. A NEW VERSION OF COOPERATION UNDER MLATs - A
TRILATERAL MLAT BETWEEN RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND
GERMANY
As examined, the three principal areas of difficulty in the coordina-
tion of fighting the Russian Mafia are sovereignty, jurisdiction, and the
inadequate coordination of activity springing from international legal
limitations. 43 Because MLATs have proven effective in circumventing
these problems on a bilateral basis, a hybrid agreement, the trilateral legal
assistance treaty (TLAT), would be effective among the United States,
Germany, and Russia in fighting Russian organized crime.
The effectiveness of the TLAT arrangement can be demonstrated
through application to a web of hypothetical international business
arrangements carried on by a Russian organized crime group. The follow-
ing situation involves several common activities of Russian organized
crime.' The various crimes are committed in Russia, Germany, and the
United States. In Russia, the group has gained control of a St. Petersburg
bank. Using funds deposited from laundering operations abroad, the group
is able to finance and pay military personnel to smuggle nuclear materials
to a transfer and distribution group in Germany. 45 Shipment and labor
funds are distributed through bank accounts arranged in the military
personnel's names. From Germany, the materials are sold and the pro-
ceeds transferred to real estate holdings in the United States, from which
the money is ultimately laundered and sent back to the St. Petersburg
bank to pay the original smugglers and finance the organization."4
" o See Interpol discussion, supra notes 89-105.
141 Id.
14 See id.
' See S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
See discussion of current activity in Russia, Germany, and the United States,
supra notes 24-48.
t4 See Zachert testimony, supra note 42.
' For a similar example, see Adam Tanner, Russian Mafia Expands into New
Areas, Using the U.S. to Launder Dirty Money, CMRUSTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Jan. 11,
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A. Overcoming the Prescriptive Jurisdiction Limitation
Without a TLAT arrangement, foreign investigations by the affected
states would be barred under the prescriptive jurisdiction limitation. 47
As demonstrated in the homicide hypothetical, none of the three countries
would be able to conduct investigations, gather evidence, or arrest sus-
pects without the permission of the sovereign government."4 The TLAT,
however, would overcome the prescriptive jurisdiction limitation through
one of its exceptions, a convention.'49
In the hypothetical situation, a TLAT would be effective for Russian
law enforcement in conducting its investigation of the illegal exportation
of Russian nuclear material. While Russian authorities would be able to
investigate and prosecute the individuals performing the act of stealing,
they would be unable to prove the link between the theft and subsequent
smuggling because the evidence of the transfer is in Germany and the
United States. Using information provided by the smugglers, a TAT
would be used to obtain testimony from individuals in Germany. 5
Because the treaty is also in force with the United States, Russian
authorities could also obtain records of money transactions to and from
the United States.''
Although it can be argued that nuclear smuggling falls under either
the effects or protective principle exceptions, a TAT would still be more
effective because it settles procedural difficulties. As demonstrated in the
discussion of Interpol, a country has no obligation, absent an agreement,
to surrender suspects or information.'52 While a state could argue that
this Russian group's smuggling activity affects its security under the
effects or protective principle, a successful prosecution depends upon
relevant evidence. 3 Furthermore, only the nuclear smuggling portion of
this transaction is covered by the effects or protective principles." 4 This
would exclude the money laundering and bank fraud activity that links
1995, at 1.
' S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
148 See Hagan, supra note 73, at 462-63, nn.114-19.
'41 See S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7)
(discussing the convention exception).
15 See Badalamenti, 626 F. Supp. at 600; Italian MLAT, supra note 130, art. 16,
24 I.L.M. at 1539.
... See supra note 127 and accompanying text for an example of the function of a
bilateral treaty allowing for the transfer of records to be used in criminal prosecutions.
's2 See Interpol discussion supra notes 89-105.
's See discussion of effects and protective principles supra notes 75-88.
154 Id.
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the operation together. 5 The protective and effects principles would
apply to only one element of the operation, leaving the rest of the activi-
ty intact. All that the Russian organized crime group would need to re-
establish the operation would be the recruitment of new smugglers. Use
of the TLAT would place the money laundering and bank fraud under the
prescriptive jurisdiction limitation exceptions, allowing for information
exchanges and prosecution.'56
B. Simplified Legal Coordination
The TLAT would also remedy the coordination problems seen with
Interpol. In our hypothetical situation, if Russia entered into separate
bilateral agreements with the United States and Germany, a limiting
clause would forbid Russia from disclosing to Germany bank records
obtained from the United States.'57 Germany would then have no way
of tracing the money from the transaction to the United States. This
would allow the Russian organized crime group to protect its German
distributors by removing the direct evidence of the transfer-the
profits-from the reach of German law enforcement. A trilateral arrange-
ment would circumvent this problem by allowing for information obtained
by one party to be used by all.
Although oversimplified, this hypothetical demonstrates the potential
of such an arrangement. Instead of prosecuting only specific actors, such
as the couriers, the entire network could be implicated through a coordi-
nation of evidence relating to the group as a whole. This would have the
impact of wiping out a much broader range of individuals. If the focus
was simply domestic, only the low-level operatives would be prosecuted
since there would be no way of effectively linking them to a greater
organization.
CONCLUSION
Because of the threat the Russian Mafia poses to world security, an
effective method of criminal enforcement must be created to better
coordinate enforcement. Because the Russian Mafia's principal bases of
,5 Id.
' S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7). The
convention element would be invoked, creating the exception.
"5 See Italian MLAT, supra note 130, art. 8, 24 I.L.M. at 1540; Swiss MLAT,
supra note 109, art. 5, § 1, 27 U.S.T. at 2029. Both treaties contain a limiting clause
restricting information obtained to the proceedings for which they are requesting. If
there is no three-way arrangement between the United States, Germany, and Russia,
some information may not end up with the proper authorities.
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activity are in the United States, Russia, and Germany, it makes sense for
the three countries to coordinate their activities. However, issues of state
sovereignty and problems of jurisdiction have proven to be barriers to
effective cooperation. MLATs in a bilateral form, however, have proven
effective in overcoming traditional problems of sovereignty and jurisdic-
tion in criminal matters. Although a trilateral MLAT has never been
attempted by any of the three countries, the evidence of its success in a
bilateral form suggests that it could be highly effective in overcoming
traditional problems of sovereignty while simultaneously creating solid,
legally binding mechanisms with which the three countries can work
together to stop the Russian Mafia's spread. Although this is only one
possible solution to the problem, it would be an effective beginning and
a vast improvement over current uncoordinated, sporadic activity.
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